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Whose Myths and Whose Reality?
Was fall 1940 truly Britain’s “finest hour,” as Winston
Churchill memorably suggested? More particularly, are
time-honored stories of stiff-lipped Londoners refusing
to buckle under the onslaught of the Luftwaffe on the
first day of the Blitz (September 7, 1940) myth or real-
ity? These are the questions Peter Stansky addresses
in this well-written, occasionally almost sentimental, es-
say. He concludes ultimately that the popular version of
Blitz history substantially reflects reality, but neverthe-
less contains many elements of heroic, comforting, and
somewhat off-target mythology.
The Blitz as a historical event has been the object
of a great deal of research. In constructing his account,
Stansky’s technique is to rely upon ubiquitous quotations
from those who actually were there, rather than on data
or public opinion polls. Clearly, first-hand testimony is
valuable. Two problems emerge with his approach, how-
ever. First, British witnesses to the bombing attack of
September 7, 1940, which constituted the Luftwaffe’s first
large assault on London, nearly always paint those events
in favorable hues. Only a few observers have chosen to
speak about the less admirable episodes of panic, looting,
and robbery that also occurred on that day and, indeed,
throughout the Blitz.
As Stansky notes, American commentators such as
Edward R. Murrow and Eric Sevareid played an impor-
tant role in the development of the sentimentalized ver-
sion of the Blitz, and they did not attempt to hide their
fervent support of the British. Their audiences had little
difficulty in separating the good guys from the bad after
listening to them. Murrow opined, “This night bombing
… makes headlines, kills people, and smashes property;
but it does not winwars” (cited on p. 108), and concluded,
“They are sustained by the history, tradition and folk-
lore of this island; supported by that well-mannered, sub-
surface British arrogance which admits no questioning of
the superiority of Britain and Britishers over any and all
other nations and other peoples” (cited on p. 110). As this
evidence demonstrates, if British rectitude, cohesion, and
courage during the Blitz are the stuff of myth, then non-
Britons bear considerable responsibility for the develop-
ment of this notion. In truth, however, very few media
commentators disputed this heroic view. Those under-
neath the bombs falling on the London docks, however,
may have been less likely to see those events through the
same lens.
The second difficulty is that available accounts of the
Blitz are heavily drawn from the ranks of upper-class
Britons, academics, and the literati. The voices of com-
moners and the partially literate–the very individuals
who soaked up the lion’s share of German bombs on Lon-
don’s East End and in its dockyards on September 7–
have often been substantially lost to history. Stansky’s
account reflects this difficulty. Indeed, he appears to pre-
fer to quote poets, essayists, novelists, and playwrights
rather than ordinary citizens in the street. In his account,
we are treated to stories surrounding what was playing
atWest End theaters (“TheThinMan” [1934], among oth-
ers), excerpts from Dorothy Sayers’s poems, and ubiqui-
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tous references to authors ranging from Graham Greene
to Bernard Kops. Works of fiction are utilized to buttress
historical claims.The art of these comments notwith-
standing, it is possible to admire Harold Nicolson’s scenic
description of combat aircraft that “flash like silver gnats
above us in the air” (cited on p. 31) without also believ-
ing that this is the way the majority Londoners experi-
enced the bombing. The work errs thus not only because
it always fails to consider the average citizen’s perspec-
tive, but also because of the inadequate weight given to
the views of such individuals when they are available. If
Britain was still class-ridden in 1940, then Stansky’s ren-
dition of what occurred on September 7th reflects that
division and offers an essentially upper-class, predomi-
nantly literary view of events. The author comments that
“the most powerful evidence of what happened during
the Blitz is the testimony of the people themselves” (p.
183). Unfortunately, the slice of people consulted in this
telling of the story only partially represents that British
society. Of course, good history writing need not be em-
pirical. Nevertheless, if one seeks to demonstrate how
the British people felt at that moment, and how they be-
haved, it is difficult to do so without reliance upon some
macro-level data, such as (for example) public opinion
polls. A scattering of such evidence does survive, but
Stansky does not marshal it to enlighten readers.
Quite a few pages of the work are focused on the ar-
gument made by RichardM. Titmuss in Problems of Social
Policy (1950) that the inability of the British government
to deal with all of the manifold challenges of the Blitz
whetted the taste of the British public for enhanced gov-
ernmental activities and thereby directly stimulated the
development of Britain’s postwar welfare state. This as-
sertion is aggressive and only partially accurate, for sev-
eral reasons. First, we can observe retrospectively that
all things considered, the 1940 British government dealt
with the problems of the Blitz remarkably well. Second,
in contrast to the view of some that the British govern-
ment entered the war grievously unprepared, not only
had it developed a functioning civil defense and fire net-
work, but also it had tested, manufactured, and deployed
both the Hurricane and Spitfire fighter planes and, in ad-
dition, had deployed a sophisticated radar warning sys-
tem that spanned all threatened areas. No empirical ev-
idence is offered in support of the Titmuss hypothesis,
which Stansky unfortunately presents in a very sympa-
thetic light.
Ultimately, Stansky concludes that a great deal of
heroic behavior was displayed on September 7th, though
the heroic may have been overemphasized in many ac-
counts. However, he ultimately avers, “if the myth of the
Blitz is considered at its more modest level, then I be-
lieve it has a fair amount of validity” (p. 186). This non-
controversial conclusion has been offered many times
previously. Finally, it is worth noting that the terrain
this book covers is ground already well plowed. As An-
gus Calder, a major historian of these events, has written,
“no archive of such abundance exists for any other ’major
event’ in British history” (cited on p. 183). One therefore
must ask what makes this book distinctive. Certainly,
the conclusions Stansky draws about heroism and myth
are not unusual. The volume’s distinctive contribution
turns out to be its use of literary and cultural materials
and references as a means to enlighten the reader and
place events in perspective. This strategy, however po-
etic, often turns out to provide only a partial view of the
momentous events of September 7,1940.
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